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7	SUPERIOR COURT OF KING COUNTY	
8	TEN INJURED WORKERS,	Cause No. 23-2-13455-9
9	Plaintiffs,	ORDER ON MOTION FOR
10 11	vs.	SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PERMANENT INJUNCTION, AND STAY
11	THE STATE OF WASHINGTON; JOEL SACKS,	AND STAY
13	in his official capacity as Director for the	
13	Department of Labor and Industries; and ROBERT	
	W. FERGUSON, in his official capacity as	
15	Attorney General for the State of Washington,	
16	Defendants.	
17		
18 19	THIS MATTER having come before the Co	ourt on the State's motion for Summary
20	Indemant to find PCW 51.26.070(4)(g) constitutional as a matter of law the Court having heard	
21	argument of the parties in open court on October 27, 2023, and having reviewed the following:	
22	1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judg	gment;
23	 Declaration of Nancy Adams in Suppo Declaration of Lewis Almaraz, MD in 	ort of Defendants' Motion;
24	4. Declaration of David Badger, MD in S	11
25	6. Declaration of Bradley J. Bergquist, M	ID in Support of Defendants' Motion;
26	7. Declaration of Craig Bone, MD in Sup	port of Defendants Motion;
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1	8.	Declaration of Mary Highley Carbone, MD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
2	9.	Declaration of Dennis Chong, MD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
	10.	Declaration of Daniel L. Christensen, MD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
3	11.	Declaration of Aleksandar Curcin, MD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
-	12.	Declaration of Kate Deisseroth, MD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
4	13.	Declaration of Matthew Lee Drake, MD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
_	14.	Declaration of Azadeh Farokhi, MD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
5	15.	Declaration of Brian Ferris, MD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
6	16.	Declaration of David Fillippone in Support of Defendants' Motion;
U	17.	Declaration of Martin Hehn, DC in Support of Defendants' Motion;
7	18.	Declaration of Scott B. Hutson, MD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
0	19.	Declaration of Michael Johnson, MD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
8	20.	Declaration of Reynold M. Karr, Jr., MD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
9	21.	Declaration of Melissa Kinder, MD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
	22.	Declaration of Scott Kitchel, MD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
10	23.	Declaration of Kal Klass, DDS in Support of Defendants' Motion;
	24.	Declaration of Diana Kraemer, MD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
11	25.	Declaration of Roman Kutsy, MD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
12	26. 27	Declaration of Christine Lloyd, MD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
12	27.	Declaration of Richard Marks, MD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
13	28. 20	Declaration of Anne P. McCormack, MD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
	29. 30.	Declaration of Theresa McFarland, MD in Support of Defendants' Motion; Declaration of Venkatachala Mohan, MD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
14	30. 31.	Declaration of Venkatachala Wohal, MD in Support of Defendants' Motion; Declaration of James Myers, DC in Support of Defendants' Motion;
15	31.	Declaration of Fames Wyers, DC in Support of Defendants' Motion; Declaration of Kenneth M. Oates, MD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
15	33.	Declaration of Jennifer Piel, MD, JD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
16	34.	Declaration of Mario E. Porras, MD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
17	35.	Declaration of Anastasia Sandstrom in Support of Defendants' Motion;
17	36.	Declaration of James R. Snyder in Support of Defendants' Motion;
18	37.	Declaration of Steven D. Sun, MD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
10	38.	Declaration of Irene Suver in Support of Defendants' Motion;
19	39.	Declaration of Paul L. Tesar, MD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
20	40.	Declaration of John I. Thayer in Support of Defendants' Motion;
20	41.	Declaration of Stephen Thielke, MD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
21	42.	Declaration of Thomas Trumble, MD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
21	43.	Declaration of Michael Upton, DC in Support of Defendants' Motion;
22	44.	Declaration of William Vasek, FCAS, PhD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
•••	45.	Declaration of Angel A. Vega, DDS in Support of Defendants' Motion;
23	46.	Declaration of Dr. Meed West in Support of Defendants' Motion;
24	47.	Declaration of Linda M. Wray, MD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
<i>–</i> r	48.	Declaration of Lauretta Young, MD in Support of Defendants' Motion;
25	49.	Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary
		Judgment;
26		

- 50. Defendants' Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; and
- 51. Declaration of Michael Ratko in Support of Defendants' Reply.

INTRODUCTION

Recent amendments to RCW 51.36.070 gave injured workers the right to audio and 5 video record their independent medical examination ("IME") performed as part of the 6 workers compensation process. An IME is an examination of the injured worker, performed 7 8 by a physician selected by the Department, used to help the Department evaluate toe worker's 9 claim. RCW 51.36.070(g) forbids a worker from posting an IME recording to social media. 10 RCW 51.48.080 provides an enforcement mechanism, stating that "Every person, firm or 11 corporation who violates or fails to obey, observe or comply with any statutory provision of 12 this act or rule of the department promulgated under authority of this title, shall be subject to a 13 penalty of not to exceed one thousand dollars." Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of 14 15 RCW 51.36.070(g), arguing that it is a prior restraint on speech. For the reasons below, the 16 Court agrees.

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ANALYSIS

18 In general, "[a] statute is presumed to be constitutional, and the party challenging its 19 constitutionality bears the burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable 20 doubt." State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 118, 132, 110 P.3d 192 (2005) (quoting State v. Thorne, 21 129 Wn.2d 736, 769–70, 921 P.2d 514 (1996)), overruled in part on other grounds by 22 23 Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 126 S.Ct. 2546, 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006). However, in 24 the First Amendment context the burden shifts and the State usually "bears the burden of 25 justifying a restriction on speech." Ino Ino, Inc. v. City of Bellevue, 132 Wn.2d 103, 114, 937 26

P.2d 154, 943 P.2d 1358 (1997). Article I, section 5 of the Washington Constitution
"categorically rules out prior restraints on constitutionally protected speech under any
circumstances." *O'Day v. King Cnty.*, 109 Wn.2d 796, 804, 749 P.2d 142, 147 (1988); *see also Ino Ino*, 132 Wash.2d at 117, 937 P.2d 154. "A prior restraint is an administrative or
judicial order *forbidding* communications prior to their occurrence. Simply stated, a prior
restraint *prohibits* future speech, as opposed to punishing past speech." *Soundgarden v. Eikenberry*, 123 Wash.2d 750, 764, 871 P.2d 1050 (1994)).

The State first argues that the act of uploading a video is not an expressive act at all, 9 analogizing to other cases involving non-expressive conduct. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for 10 Academic & Institutional Rights., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 164 L. Ed. 2d 156 11 12 (2006) (denying military recruiters access to school facilities); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative 13 Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294, 104 S. Ct. 3065, 3069, 82 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1984) (camping 14 on federal property); The Bail Project, Inc. v. Commissioner, 76 F.4th 569, 577 (7th Cir. 15 2023) (posting bail for indigent defendants); State v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., 193 Wn.2d 469, 16 512, 441 P.3d 1203 (2019) (arranging flowers); Clancy v. Off. of Foreign Assets Control of 17 U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 559 F.3d 595, 605 (7th Cir. 2009) (travel to a foreign war zone). The 18 19 State further argues that although speech concerning an IME video is protected, because the 20 statute restricts only (in their view) a non-expressive act, the statute is a permissible content-21 neutral restriction on the time, place and manner of speech. The State points to its interests in 22 preserving a robust supply of IME doctors, and to the risks of reputational harm to those 23 doctors from potentially altered videos being shared to social media. 24

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1	The Court cannot agree with the State that posting on social media is not speech. First	
2	the United States Supreme Court has recognized the importance of the internet and social	
3	media as the primary forum for exchanging views in modern life:	
4	While in the past there may have been difficulty in identifying the most	
5	important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today the answer is clear. It is cyberspace—the "vast democratic forums of the Internet"	
6	in general, and social media in particular. Seven in ten American adults use at least one Internet social networking service In short, social media users	
7	employ these websites to engage in a wide array of protected First Amendment activity on topics as diverse as human thought.	
8	Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98, 104–05, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735–36, 198 L. Ed.	
9		
10	2d 273 (2017) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Certain circuits have found that	
11	even the act of "liking" a post on social media is speech. See Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368,	
12	386 (4th Cir. 2013), as amended (Sept. 23, 2013) (holding that the act of liking a political	
13	page on social media is equivalent to the protected speech of placing a campaign sign in one's	
14	yard). The act of posting on social media, in our connected modern world, is fundamentally	
15 16	different from the non-expressive acts performed in cases the State relies on. The act of	
17	posting even a video, without more, on social media is fundamentally an act of speaking to	
18	one's community and holding up to light actions deserving of either praise or condemnation.	
19	A statute that criminalized a private citizen posting a video of police officers on social media	
20	would clearly be a prior restraint on speech. So too here. The distinction is immaterial to the	
21	constitutional analysis. This statute literally regulates the content of a private citizen's social	
22	media posts and forbids posting a video to which an injured worker otherwise has a right to	
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25	The State further argues, that even if the act of posting the IME video is expressive,	
26	that RCW 51.36.070(g) is a valid, content-neutral, time, place and manner restriction. Content	
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neutral time place and manner restrictions are fundamentally different than prior restraints. 1 They restrict things like the location of speech, or its volume, without targeting its content. 2 See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 764 (1994) (treating limited buffer 3 4 zones around private property as content neutral restricting on time, place and manner of 5 speech); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (treating a blanket ban on residential 6 picketing as content-neutral); Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 640-42 (9th Cir. 7 1998) (upholding as content-neutral an ordinance limiting each protester to one sign that is at 8 most three square feet in area); World Wide Street Preachers' Fellowship v. Town of 9 Columbia, 411 F. Supp. 2d 671, 677 (W.D. La. 2006) (concluding that a content-neutral ban 10 on standing in the street could be applied to protesters displaying pictures of aborted fetuses); 11 12 Showing Animals Respect & Kindness v. City of W. Hollywood, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 134, 137 (Ct. 13 App. 2008) (upholding a content-neutral ban on all mobile billboards). Notably, none of these 14 permissible restrictions regulated the content (even non-verbal photo or video content) being 15 displayed. The statute at issue here is the opposite of content neutral—it directly targets only 16 social media posts that contain an injured worker's lawfully obtained IME video. 17

In sum, this case is most similar to *State v. Coe*, 101 Wn.2d 364, 373, 679 P.2d 353, 18 19 359 (1984). There, the Court examined a trial court order that "held a radio and television 20 station in contempt for violating a court order prohibiting the broadcast of accurate, lawfully 21 obtained copies of tape recordings that had been played in open court." Id. at 364. There, as 22 here, there was a record made of the harms that could result if the material was published— 23 trial counsel argued that publication of the tapes could cause great harm to the defendant's 24 mental state. Id. at 367. There, as here, the order did not restrict all forms of dissemination, 25just video broadcasts, leaving open other means for the media to share their contents. Id. at 26

1	368. The Supreme Court rejected all of these arguments in defense of the order, holding that it		
2	was a "classic prior restraint," not content neutral, and therefore unconstitutional. Id. at 373.		
3	So too here. Accordingly, the State's Motion for Summary Judgment is herewith denied, and		
4	at the urging of the State to provide summary judgment relief to the non-moving party the		
5	following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Permanent Injunction are issued:		
6	Findings of Fact		
7	1.	This court has jurisdiction over parties and subject matter. The Attorney	
8	1.	General has been properly served under RCW 7.24.110.	
9	2.	RCW 51.36.070(4)(a) provides that an injured worker may audio and/or video	
10		record an IME exam.	
11			
12	3.	RCW 51.36.070(4)(g) provides that an injured worker may not post an audio	
13		and/or video recording of their IME exam to social media.	
	4.	Wash. Const. art. I, § 5 states, "[e]very person may freely speak, write and	
14		publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right."	
15		rate a subject, to g or rest to the subject of g of	
16	5.	U.S. Const. amend. I states, "Congress shall make no law abridging the	
17		freedom of speech, or of the press."	
18	6.	RCW 51.36.070(4)(g) permits the State to impose fines on members of the	
19		public based purely on the content of their social media posts.	
20	7.	RCW 51.36.070(4)(g) is a prior restraint against both free speech and free	
21	7.	publication under both the Wash. Const. art. I, § 5 and U.S. Const. amend. I.	
22		publication under bour the wash. Const. art. 1, § 5 and 0.5. Const. amend. 1.	
23	8.	RCW 51.98.030 is a savings clause that provides, "[i]f any provision of this	
		title is held invalid, the remainder of the title is not affected.	
24	0	$\mathbf{DCW} = 1 + 1 $	
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26	without impairing any fundamental purpose or collateral provision of said Act.		
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1		Conclusions of Law	
2	1.	RCW 51.36.070(4)(g) is not a content-neutr	ral "time, place, and manner"
3		restriction on speech.	
4	2.	RCW 51.36.070(4)(g) is a prior restraint on	protected speech.
5	3.	RCW 51.36.070(4)(g) is unconstitutional un	nder U.S. Const. amend. I.
6 7	4.	RCW 51.36.070(4)(g) is unconstitutional un	nder State Const., art. I, § 5.
8	5.	The remainder of RCW 51.36.070 continue	s in operation but subsection (4)(g)
9		must be stricken as unconstitutional and une	enforceable against injured
10		workers.	
11	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the State's Motion is		
12	denied,		
13	1.	The State is permanently enjoined from enfo	prcing RCW 51.36.070(4)(g) against
14		injured workers who post recordings of their	
15	2.	The permanent injunction is STAYED per	ending review by the Washington
16		Supreme Court.	ending review by the washington
17		1	
18	B Dated this 15th day of November 2023.		
19			
20			ic signature attached RABLE JOE CAMPAGNA
21			
22			
23 24	Presented by:		
24 25	WASHINGTON LAW CENTER		
23 26			
20		OTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT	WASHINGTON LAW CENTER
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Signed By:	Joe Campagna
Date:	November 15, 2023

Joe Carp

Judge: Joe Campagna

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